The structure, conduct, and regulation of the property-liability insurance industry by J. David Cummins & Mary A. Weiss
The Structure, Conduct,
and Regulation of the
Property-Liability
Insurance Industry
J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss*
Dissatisfaction with property-liability insurance is widespread and
seems to be growing. Insurance availability and affordability have
become major issues in election campaigns nationwide, and Congress is
threatening to impose new federal regulations. This unusual amount of
attention seems to reflect fundamental changes in the nature of insur-
ance and insurance markets. Insurers maintain that they are functioning
as efficiently and effectively as possible under difficult circumstances.
But a significant proportion of the public, public interest groups,
legislators, and regulators believe that insurers themselves are a primary
cause of the problems in property-liability markets.
This paper presents an analysis of the structure, conduct, and
performance of the suppliers of property-liability insurance. The dis-
cussion is carried out in the context of the market problems that have
plagued the property-liability insurance industry in recent years. The
objective is to provide an indication of the relative roles of insurer
conduct and external structural factors in creating the turmoil in this
important market. The paper begins with an overview of the problems
and issues in property-liability insurance markets. Each issue raises
important questions about market structure and performance. Subse-
quent sections of the paper evaluate industry market structure and
explore its implications for the solution of the problems confronted by
the property-liability insurance industry.
*Harry J. Loman Professor of Insurance and Risk Management, The Wharton School,
University of Pennsylvania; and Assistant Professor of Risk Management and Insurance,
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Problems in Property-Liability Insurance
Property-liability markets have undergone a series of crises during
the past 20 years. Each crisis has spurred regulatory or legislative action
in an attempt to solve the problem and return markets to normalcy.
While some of these actions have been effective, the problems have not
been eliminated and, in fact, continue to recur. Their persistence
suggests that a different approach may be necessary. This section
presents an overview of the market problems in property-liability
insurance, in order to provide the context for the structure and perfor-
mance discussion to follow.
Insurer Solvency
Perhaps the first to surface was the problem of insurer insolvency.
During the late 1960s, numerous insurer insolvencies took place among
so-called "high-risk" auto insurance companies. The primary cause of
the failures was fraud and mismanagement (Olson 1970). Following
congressional hearings and a major study by the U.S. Department of
Transportation, the states implemented more stringent solvency moni-
toring and created state insurance guaranty funds to compensate
policyholders owed money by failed insurers. Unfortunately, the insol-
vency problem has not gone away and, in fact, worsened during the
1980s. Guaranty funds may even have contributed to the insolvency
problem by inducing insurers to take excessive risk (Cummins 1988).
Several market structure questions are raised by the insolvency
issue: (1) How serious is the insolvency threat in property-liability
insurance? (2) Does the organization of insurance markets provide
appropriate incentives for the maintenance of solvency? (3) Is regulation
the answer, or would less intrusive approaches be equally effective? The
latter question is particularly important in view of the move to subject
the industry to increased solvency regulation at the federal level.
Pricing and Rate Regulation
A second major problem concerns pricing and rate regulation.
Workers’ compensation is the most heavily regulated line, with rates
subject to prior regulatory approval in all but a handful of states. Private
passenger auto insurance is regulated by about one-half of the states.
Most commercial lines such as commercial auto and general liability in
effect have been subject to minimal price regulation.
Although a trend towards deregulation of insurance rates appeared
during the 1970s, the liability insurance crisis of 1984-85 (see below) and
the problem of inflation in private passenger auto insurance (Cummins
and Tennyson 1992) have focused renewed attention on rate regulation.
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private passenger auto insurance, by approving Proposition 103, which
enacted sweeping reforms of the property-liability industry and the
regulatory system. Among its provisions were a mandatory 20 percent
rate rollback, applicable to most lines of insurance, and the imposition of
rate regulation in a market where competitive rating had been in effect
for more than 40 years. Proposition 103 is symptomatic of public
dissatisfaction with insurance and the insurance industry. Rising insur-
ance costs have led to similar movements in other states ranging from
Arizona to Pennsylvania.
A beneficial aspect of intensified rate regulation, particularly in Mas-
sachusetts, has been the development of more sophisticated rate-making
methodologies (Cummins and Harrington 1987). These methods have the
potential for use in rational rate regulation and in the monitoring of prices
and profits under competitive regulatory regimes. Unfortunately, their
lessons have not yet been absorbed by regulators in California and most
other jurisdictions. The use of inappropriate methodologies can unfairly
penalize insurers and destabilize insurance markets.
The questions raised by the price inflation/rate regulation issue are
the following: (1) To what extent are price increases merely a reflection
of underlying cost factors beyond the control of insurers? (2) Are
insurers taking appropriate measures to control claims costs? (3) Is
increased rate regulation likely to reduce the rate of insurance inflation,
or could the market be restructured to permit market forces to control
costs more effectively?
Market Failure in Liability Insurance
The liberalization of liability rules and changing public and judicial
attitudes toward lawsuits during the past 20 years have led to significant
increases in the frequency and severity of liability claims. The result has
been destabilization and, in some instances, the collapse of liability
insurance markets.
The first to be affected was the market for medical malpractice
insurance. Increasing uncertainty and rising costs in this market led
most of the major multiple line insurers to withdraw in the mid to late
1970s. Eventually, tort reform and the introduction of medical mutuals
led to the reestablishment of a market for this type of insurance. The
problems of malpractice insurance subsequently spread to other types of
liability insurance. Particularly hard-hit were segments of the market
such as environmental pollution liability, where insurers faced signifi-
cant difficulties in estimating claim costs. Unlike the malpractice case,
well-functioning markets for risky coverages such as pollution liability
have not been reestablished.
The culmination of the difficulties in the liability insurance market
was the crisis of 1984-85. Industrywide, premiums increased by 78120 J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
percent in 1985 and 68 percent in 1986. Price increases exceeded several
hundred percent for some policyholders; for many, coverage was
unavailable at any price. A number of regulatory and public policy
measures were adopted in response to the liability crisis such as risk
retention groups (RRGs) and flex-rating plans, which require insurers to
file for prior approval any rate changes exceeding a specified range.
Among the issues raised by the liability crisis are the following:
(1) To what extent was the crisis unique to the 1980s; that is, are
underlying structural factors present that make such crises likely to
recur in the future? (2) Is increased rate regulation likely to prevent
crises and stabilize liability markets? (3) Is tort reform needed to
maintain the liability market? (4) Could the market be restructured to
permit market forces to cope more effectively with future crises?
Underwriting Cycles
Reported underwriting profits in property-liability insurance follow
a cyclical pattern that averages about six years in length. The usual
description of the cycle is that of recurrent soft and hard markets.
During a soft market, coverage is widely available and insurers compete
vigorously in price. The price competition eventually causes profits to
deteriorate. When prices and/or insurer equity levels become "too low,"
a hard market develops. Hard markets are characterized by rising prices
and reductions in the quantity sold. After prices rise sufficiently to
restore profitability, the market softens and the cycle begins anew.
Among the questions raised by the cycle are the following: (1) What
causes the real cycle? (2) To what extent are price/availability crises such
as the general liability crisis of 1984-85 just extreme forms of the
ordinary price cycle? (3) What can be done to prevent cycles and stabilize
insurance prices?
Anticompetitive Practices
Accusations of anticompetitive practices are a common element of
the public policy debate about property-liability insurance. The exis-
tence of rating bureaus such as the Insurance Services Office (ISO) and
the National Council on Compensation Insurance (NCCI) is viewed by
many as impeding price competition. Critics have used the existence of
bureau pricing as evidence in favor of the repeal of the McCarran-
Ferguson Act, which currently exempts insurers from federal antitrust
laws.
Other observers argue that bureau pricing is not anticompetitive.
They point out that pooling of loss data is necessary in order to achieve
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advantage of economies of scale in data collection, computer equipment
purchases, and legal and actuarial expertise. They contend that many
smaller companies would be forced out of the market by high expenses
if they had to perform these tasks on their own. Even so, the ISO
announced in 1989 that it would phase out advisory rate filings and limit
its activities to serving as a statistical agent. The NCCI and other bureaus
are also cutting back their rate filing activities.
A more serious problem is the allegation that insurers collude by
using restricted output as a threat to obtain more favorable contract
terms. This allegation resulted in a 1988 suit against the industry by 19
state attorneys general. The suit charges that insurers conspired to push
for the adoption of claims-made forms to replace occurrence forms in
general liability insurance. 1
Perhaps the most troublesome of the alleged antitrust issues is that
of retroactive loss loading (Cummins and Tennyson 1992). Since insur-
ance prices are set prospectively, insurers should have strong incentives
to control claim costs. Any reductions in claim costs should flow
through directly to profit. Furthermore, standard competitive pricing
theory implies that insurers should not be able to phss along past pricing
errors to future policyholders; that is, they should not be able to
retroactively load past losses into future rates. However, much of the
discussion of insurance inflation suggests that insurers do engage in
retroactive loss loading and, as a result, do not have very strong
incentives to control claim costs. The usual allegation is that insurers do
not do enough to resist fraudulent claims and keep claim costs under
control. Under this reasoning, mandatory rate rollbacks make sense
because they refund part of the retroactive loss load to buyers and can
be used to motivate insurers to take appropriate loss control measures.
The anticompetitive allegations raise several important questions
about industry market structure and conduct: (1) Is the insurance market
actually competitive, or do significant anticompetitive elements remain?
(2) Would small insurers be placed at a cost disadvantage if rating
bureaus were further restricted? (3) Do insurers engage in retroactive
loss loading or are they taking effective measures to control claims costs?
These and other issues are explored in more detail below.
i Occurrence policies protect the insured against loss arising from any covered
occurrence during the policy period regardless of when the lawsuit is filed (subject, of
course, to statutes of limitations, and the like). Thus, losses due to a negligent act
performed during the current contract period would be covered by the current contract
even if lawsuits are filed and settled subsequent to the contract year. A claims-made policy
covers the insured only for claims made in the current contract year. Claims-made policies
are favored by insurers because they make claim costs more predictable.122 J. David Cum~nins and Many A. Weiss
The Structure of the Property-Liability Insurance
Market
The insurance industry traditionally has been viewed as competi-
tive (Josl~ow 1973). However, in view of the questions that have been
raised about market conduct, it seems appropriate to take another look
at the structure of the industry.
Numbers and Types of Firms
One of the myths about property-liability insurance is that the vast
number of insurance companies (roughly 3,000) proves that competition
exists. However, only about 1,900 firms play a significant role in the
market, and 1,300 of these are clustered together in about 340 insurance
groups under common ownership. After controlling for grouping, only
about 1,000 independent entities operate in the property-liability insur-
ance market.2
Since property-liability insurance is not a homogeneous product, it
is appropriate to look at specific market segments when analyzing the
number of firms. Insurance markets are segmented by line of business
and by geographical location. Table 1 shows the principal lines of
insurance and their premium volume in 1981, 1985, and 1989. A striking
result is the overriding importance of automobile insurance, which
represents nearly 45 percent of total industry revenues. The most
important commercial line is workers’ compensation, representing 14
percent of total premium volume, although liability coverages such as
general liability and medical malpractice have been growing in impor-
tance.
The numbers of firms by line of insurance in 1981, 1985, and 1989
are shown in Figure 1. Between 400 and 500 firms write private
passenger auto insurance. Although this indicates a market that has a
viable number of competitive firms, the number of firms writing in any
particular geographical area is likely to be much smaller, especially in
problem areas such as inner cities, which have few suppliers. It is
perhaps surprising that so many firms are in the general liability market,
given the instability of the market during the 1980s. Unlike the malprac-
tice market of the 1970s, the crisis conditions did not lead to a wholesale
withdrawal of firms from the market. The number of firms writing
general liability increased from 573 in 1981 to 617 in 1985 and 737 in 1989.
In a few markets, such as medical malpractice, workers’ compen-
sation, and reinsurance, the number of firms has been declining. To the
2 These data are taken from Best’s Aggregates and Averages, 1989 Edition. Oldwick, NJ:
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Table 1
Net Premiums Written in Property-Liability Insurance
Percent of Total
Line of Insurance 1981 1985 1989
Private Passenger Auto Liability 19.8 19.3 21.1
Private Passenger Auto Physical Damage 14.1 14.5 14.2
Commercial Auto Liability 4.8 5.4 5.8
Commercial Auto Physical Damage 2.7 2.8 2.5
Homeowners 11.5 9.6 8.5
Fire and Allied 5.1 4.3 3.4
Commercial Multiple Peril 6.9 8.3 8.4
General Liability 6.1 7.9 8.8
Medical Malpractice 1.3 2.0 2.1
Workers’ Compensation 14.7 11.8 13.6
Reinsurance 3.3 3.9 3.3
Other 9.7 10.2 8.3
Total Premiums (Millions) $99,268 $146,091 $208,388
Source: A. M. Best Co. 1990. Best’s Aggregates and Averages.
extent that weaker firms made these exits, the decline in the number of
firms should not be viewed as an adverse development. For example, it
is widely believed that underpricing by thinly capitalized reinsurers
contributed to market conditions that led to the 1984-85 crisis. However,
all three lines are also considered relatively risky, and the decline in the
number of competitors may indicate that supply problems are on the
horizon.
Organizational Form
The issue of organizational form in insurance has attracted consid-
erable attention in the academic literature. The predominant organiza-
tional forms in insurance are stock companies, mutuals, and reciprocals.
Stock companies are owned by stockholders, whereas mutuals have no
capital stock and are nominally owned by their policyholders. Recipro-
cals are associations of buyers who agree to mutually insure one
another. Because most modern reciprocals are not distinguishable from
mutuals, they are grouped together with mutuals for the statistical
analysis presented below.3
3 Reciprocals differ from mutuals in being unincorporated and in being operated by an
attorney-in-fact, which may be a corporation. The traditional reciprocal maintained
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The existence and continued survival of different organizational
forms in insurance is generally attributed to the fact that they have
differential advantages in dealing with particular types of insurance.
According to the economic theory of agency, the modern firm is viewed
as a nexus of contracts entered into by various parties to bring about the
production or distribution of goods and services. The three major con-
tracting groups in insurance are owners, managers, and policyholders.
The owners are the residual claimants to the firm’s assets. In the
modern stock company, ownership is typically separated from manage-
ment; that is, the owners do not manage the firm themselves but instead
hire professional managers. The managers become the agents of the
ate claim assessments made. If deposits were insufficient to pay claims, members could be
assessed, within limits defined by the reciprocity agreement. Members withdrawing from
the pool were permitted to take their account balance. Most modern reciprocals typically
are not assessable and do not maintain separate member accounts. The Lloyds association,
modeled after Lloyds of London, is a fourth organizational form. Lloyds associations have
not proved to be a viable organizational form in this country.THE PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY 125
owners; they are hired to act on behalf of the owners. However, the
managers have their own objectives, which may diverge from those of
the owners. For example, the owners may want to maximize the value
of their equity share in the firm while the managers (agents) want to
maximize their own compensation or prestige. To prevent the managers
from acting opportunistically in those situations where .their interests
and the owners’ interests diverge, the owners must expend resources to
monitor and control management behavior and provide incentive com-
pensation to align the managers’ interests more closely with their own.
These activities generate agency costs.
In addition to owner-manager conflicts, potential conflicts also arise
between owners and policyholders and between managers and policy-
holders. For example, owners want maximum flexibility with respect to
pricing and underwriting, while policyholders prefer stable premiums
and no uncertainty with regard to coverage amounts or availability.
Stockholders also may have an incentive to increase firm risk, thus
reducing the value of debt (policy) claims and increasing the value of
owners’ equity. To protect themselves from exploitation by owners,
policyholders must incur agency costs, for example, to monitor the
insurer’s financial condition after purchasing the policy. Conflicts can
also arise between policyholders and managers. Most insurance services
are delegated by company management to insurance agents, and the
agent’s interest may diverge from that of the policyholder. For example,
the agent can maximize his own value by charging a high price and
giving minimal service, whereas the policyholder is looking for a lower
price and better service.
Mayers and Smith (1989) have used the theory of agency to develop
hypotheses about the success of various organizational forms in insur-
ance. They point out that mutuals are likely to be successful in lines
where the owner-policyholder conflict is relatively important because
the policyholder-owner functions are merged in a mutual. However, the
owner-manager conflict is more significant in a mutual than in a stock
company since mutual policyholders do not have the option of selling
their ownership share or launching a proxy fight if management is not
performing according to expectations.4 Mayers and Smith hypothesize
that mutuals will be most successful in lines of business where the need
for managerial discretion in pricing and underwriting is relatively low,
4 Actually, in principle, a proxy battle would be feasible in a mutual insurer. In
practice, with the large number of policyholders in most modern mutuals, a successful
proxy battle would be virtually impossible to sustain. The situation is different in
organizations such as medical mutuals, particularly those operating in narrow geograph-
ical areas, because the fewer policyholders are already in contact through professional
societies. This is one reason why the medical mutual has proved to be a successful
organizational type.126 J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
for example, in lines-with good actuarial tables and relatively high
policyholder homogeneity. Mutuals should also do better in lines
characterized by long-term policies, where the possibilities for stock-
holder expropriation through excessive risk-taking are highest. Finally,
mutuals should be most successful if they limit their operations to a few
lines of coverage and/or a relatively narrow geographical area. These
restrictions limit management’s ability to exploit policyholders.
Conversely, stock companies should do better in lines that require
a higher degree of managerial discretion. In addition, stocks should
have an advantage in dealing with high-risk lines of business because
they can spread risk not only over the policyholder pool but also across
the securities markets. The superior ability of stock firms to raise capital
enables them to rebuild their capital position quickly following an
adverse loss shock.
The market shares by organizational form are shown in Figure 2.
The data are generally consistent with the organizational form hypoth-
eses. Overall, stock companies account for 61.4 percent of the property-
liability insurance market. However, mutuals and reciprocals account
for more than half the market in private passenger auto, homeowners,
and medical malpractice insurance. Private auto and homeowners are
personal lines requiring relatively low managerial discretion in pricing
and underwriting. Thus, owner-manager conflicts in these lines are
likely to be low. Malpractice is a line characterized by long-term (that is,
long-tail) policies as well as a relatively high degree of control over
management on the part of the owner-policyholders.S It is also note-
worthy that stock insurers are dominant in general liability, a line
requiring both a high degree of managerial discretion in setting rates
and the ability to diversify risk and raise capital.
The findings on organizational form have implications for public
policy towards insurance markets. For example, these findings indicate
the types of insurance in which the formation of mutuals is likely to be
a viable solution to limitations on insurance supply. They also reinforce
the notion that access to capital markets is critical to maintaining the
supply of insurance.
Distribution Channels
Marketing costs absorb a significant share of the insurance premium
dollar. Industrywide, the ratio of marketing expenses to premiums
written is 17.2 percent, expressed in percentage terms. The administra-
~ This control is maintained because the ownersof most medical mutuals are already
joined together in professional associations and because medical mutuals operate in
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Figure 2 Property-Liability Insurance
Market Share by Organizational
Form and Line, 1989
Percent







Source: A. M. Best Co,, Best’s Executive Data Service (BEDS).
rive expense ratio, including marketing and other costs, is 26.0 percent.
Thus, marketing costs account for about two-thirds of the total non-loss
expenses of the property-liability insurance industry. It is not surprising
that insurance reformers have focused a considerable amount of atten-
tion on insurance marketing expenses.
Of course, agents perform valuable services in return for these
expenses. Agents advise policyholders on insurance coverages and
provide assistance with claims settlement. For business clients, the
agent’s services are likely to be even more extensive. For insurers,
agents provide an initial underwriting screen and gather critical under-
writing data. The question is not whether agents provide services but
whether the services could be provided at a lower total cost.
The four major types of marketing channels in property-liability
insurance are independent agents; exclusive agents; direct writing, that
is, mail or telemarketing; and brokers. Independent agents represent
more than one company (about six on average). They are paid by128 J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
commission, ranging from 15 to 30 percent of the premium depending
upon the line of business. Their most salient distinguishing feature is
the ownership of renewals. Ownership of renewals means that the
agent and not the company owns the client list. If a company terminates
the independent agent, the agent retains control of the business and is
free to switch it to another company.
In contrast, exclusive agents represent only one company. They are
also paid by commission but the commission is usually less than the
independent agent’s. In the exclusive agency system, the company and
not the agent owns the client list. Direct writers do not use agents but
instead use company employees who sell insurance by telephone. Direct
writing companies are fully vertically integrated, exclusive agency firms
display a degree of vertical integration, and independent agency firms
are not vertically integrated. Brokers differ from agents in the technical
sense that the broker represents the buyer, while the agent represents
the company. In the practical sense, the most successful brokers are
relatively large firms, often with international interests, providing
specialized services to business clients.
Direct writing and exclusive agency companies have lower expense
ratios than independent agency companies (Cummins and VanDerhei
1979). The expense ratios for a sample of insurance companies using
these distribution systems are presented in Table 2. The expense ratio
differences are largest in the personal lines. Earlier studies contended
that independent agency firms have higher expense ratios because they
are less efficient than exclusive agency firms and suggested that the
costs of insurance could be reduced if all insurers sold directly or used
exclusive agents. Later researchers (for example, see Pauly, Kunreuther,
and Kleindorfer 1986) have argued that the expense difference is not a
deadweight loss but rather that independent agency firms are more
service-intensive.
A more modern view uses the theory of agency to analyze insur-
ance distribution (see Regan 1991). One version of this argument
acknowledges that independent agents are less efficient than exclusive
agents, at least for some types of coverage. The primary reason for this
is that exclusive agency firms can install a single computerized pricing
and rating system that links every agent directly with the company.6 Of
course, independent agency firms also can put computer systems in
their agencies, but in general these firms do only a fraction of the
business in each agency. They are also powerless to prevent others from
free-riding on their technology. The agency theory view argues that
independent agents survive in spite of their cost disadvantage because
6 Under prior technologies, the exclusive agents also had an advantage, but on the
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Table 2
Expense Ratios, by Distribution System, 1989
Percent of Premiums
Distribution System
Line of insurance Direct Exclusive Independent
Private Passenger Auto Liability 20.5 24.6 29.3
Private Passenger Auto Physical Damage 20.3 23.5 29.0
Commercial Auto Liability 17.8 22.8 29.9
Commercial Auto Physical Damage 22.5 26.8 31.3
Homeowners 26.1 28.6 36.0
Fire 33.4 33.1 37.9
Allied Lines 30.9 31.2 35.5
Commercial Multiple Peril 24.8 36.1 35.9
General Liability 24.4 25.1 28.6
Medical Malpractice -- 11.5 25.7
Workers’ Compensation 15.1 21.1 22.1
Reinsurance 9.4 29.0 26.9
Source: A. M. Best Co. 1990. Best’s Aggregates and Averages.
they are more effective than exclusive agents in dealing with certain
types of "agency" conflicts. Thus, the higher cost of independent
agencies represents rents paid to them to cope with these conflicts.
Independent agents are adept at dealing with conflicts between the
company and the policyholder. Companies have an incentive to mini-
mize services and delay claim payments, a particular problem for small
business buyers who do not have much leverage over the insurer.
Furthermore, an insurer is unlikely to grant trade credit to a small
business buyer on favorable terms. Unlike the buyer, the independent
agent does have leverage with the company because of his or her ability
to switch clients to another insurer. Thus, the agent can intervene to
ensure better services. The agent can also provide trade credit to the
buyer because independent agents bill commercial customers directly
and then remit the premium balance to the insurer.7
The market advantages conveyed to the buyer by the independent
agent are line-specific; for example, trade credit is more significant for
business buyers than for personal buyers. The premium volume of the
typical personal lines buyer is not sufficient to justify the use of much of
the agent’s time. Personal buyers are likely to be served more effectively
7 This is obviously not an efficient system because it leaves the insurer with
non-interest-bearing receivables. Insurers have made some progress in converting inde-
pendent agents to direct billing, especially for personal lines, but for commercial lines most
business is still agency billed.130 J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
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by more efficient firms which can control quality by standardizing
services across their captive agency force. Thus, independent agents
should be more successful in commercial lines and exclusive agents and
direct writers in the personal lines. Figure 3 shows that these predictions
are borne out. The largest market penetrations for exclusive and direct
companies are in personal auto, where these firms have about 60
percent of the market, and in homeowners, where their share is over 50
percent. Exclusive agency firms have a much lower market share in
commercial multiple peril, general liability, and other commercial lines.
Agents also have a type of market power that may be viewed as
anticompetitive. Specifically, they are protected from price competition
by anti-rebate laws in most states. These laws, which are a form of resale
price maintenance, prohibit agents from discounting, that is, from
"rebating" part of the commission to the buyer. Anti-rebate laws
impede price competition and prevent the formation of wholesalers,
who could provide insurance at a discount. The insurance market would
be more efficient if these laws were repealed, as a few states have
recently done.THE PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY 131
Table 3
Concentration in Property-Liability Insurance, 1989
Percent
Top 4 Top 10 Top 50 Herfindahl
Line of Insurance Firms Firms Firms Index
Private Passenger Auto Liability 43.2 56.6 85.6 .0650
Private Passenger Auto Physical
Damage 41.8 53.9 80.4 .0676
Commercial Auto Liability 19.6 38.1 80.9 .0214
Commercial Auto Physical Damage 19.6 35.0 78.0 .0313
Homeowners 39.5 52.7 82.1 .0573
Fire and Allied 18.9 36.3 73.9 .0149
Commercial Multiple Peril 21.8 43.1 85.9 .0263
General Liability 32.6 51.9 84.5 .0450
Medical Malpractice 32.0 52.3 92.4 .0364
Workers’ Compensation 26.7 49.2 88.4 .0364
Reinsurance 46.1 63.6 94.3 .0584
Total 24.2 40.4 75.3 .0257
Source: A. M, Best Co. 1990. Best’s Aggregates and Averages and Best’s Executive Data Service
(BEDS); authors’ calculations.
Market Concentration
In the traditional theory of industrial organization, concentration
was held to facilitate oligopolistic or collusive practices and thereby to
lead to noncompetitive profits. The more modern view is that increasing
concentration, at least within limits, may be a natural development in
some markets and does not necessarily have adverse consequences. If
efficient firms are gaining market share, prices may fall at the same time
that concentration and possibly profits rise.
Such a scenario may be applicable to some lines of property-liability
insurance. Four- and ten-firm concentration ratios and Herfindahl
indices for the principal lines of insurance are presented in Table 3.
Concentration is highest in the personal lines, particularly private
passenger auto and homeowners, where the exclusive agency firms and
direct writers have a significant efficiency advantage. Eight of the top ten
firms in personal auto and six of the top ten in homeowners are
exclusive or direct writing firms. The hypothesis advanced here is that
these firms owe their market share primarily to their efficiency advan-
tage in dealing with personal clients. Thus, gains in market share by
these firms would be expected to be accompanied by lower prices.132 J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
Further concentration of these markets should not necessarily be viewed
as adverse.
The expense ratio advantage of the exclusive and direct firms does
not necessarily translate into a competitive advantage in commercial
lines markets. Buyers in these markets may be willing to pay rents to
independent agents to intervene with insurers. In addition, the mix of
commercial lines business written by independent agency firms may be
significantly different from that written by exclusive and. direct writing
firms. Independent agency firms may tend to write larger, more
complicated exposures that require higher service intensity. If so, one
would expect to see lower concentration levels in commercial lines
because independent agency firms can compete more effectively and
because they are more numerous than exclusive agency firms. This is
exactly what the data in Table 3 show. In contrast to the 43 percent
four-firm concentration ratio in personal auto, the ratio in commercial
auto is only 20 percent. Commercial multiple peril, a package policy
somewhat similar to homeowners, has a four-firm concentration ratio
about one-half that of homeowners.
Further information on concentration is provided in Figure 4, which
shows the Herfindahl indices for direct business and reinsurance
assumed.8 Figure 4 supports the hypothesis that vertically integrated
firms have an advantage in the personal lines. The Herfindahl indices
for direct premiums written in the personal lines are higher than the
corresponding indices for reinsurance assumed. Because of their effi-
ciency, the vertically integrated firms hold a large share of the direct
market. However, vertical integration conveys no particular advantage
in the reinsurance market, so the independent agency firms retain a
larger share of this market. The pattern is reversed in the commercial
lines. Here, concentration is lower in direct markets than in reinsurance
markets. Independent and exclusive agency firms compete on a more
equal footing in the commercial lines direct markets. However, because
of the riskiness of many commercial coverages, fewer firms have the
risk-bearing capability to handle reinsurance in these lines, leading to a
more concentrated reinsurance market.
Entry and Exit
Ease of entry and exit are essential to maintaining a competitive
market. The threat of entry prevents existing firms in the industry from
8 Reinsurance is essentially insurance purchased by insurers from other insurers.
Insurers purchase reinsurance in order to reduce risk through diversification and increase
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overpricing. Freedom of exit is important because firms are reluctant to
enter markets if they will incur substantial costs upon exiting.
The most important sources of entry in property-liability insurance
are (1) the formation of new insurers, (2) entry by existing property-
liability insurers into new lines and markets, (3) entry by other financial
service firms such as life insurers and banks, and (4) self insurance, risk
retention groups, and captives. The direct costs of entry as a new insurer
appear to be low. The insurer must meet minimum capital and surplus
requirements, but these do not appear to be sufficient to serve as a
serious entry barrier. Obtaining state licenses can be a costly and
time-consuming process, but methods are available for speeding up the
process, such as purchasing an inactive insurer or "shell.’’9
9 A few states, such as New York, have seasoning requirements that prevent insurers
from entering until they have been in business for some number of years (for example,
three to five). Obviously, if every state had such a requirement, seasoning would serve as
a "’catch-22." Fortunately, this is not the case.134 J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
The need for a marketing force can serve as a barrier to entry in
property-liability insurance. Independent agents partially fulfill this role
¯ because they can easily add new insurers to their portfolio. However,
agents tend to place a high proportion of their business with their lead
carriers,lo This means that new entrants are not likely to receive the
independent agent’s most desirable business; and they may have to pay
higher commissions to attract agents, increasing their expenses. Entry as
a de novo exclusive agency firm is also difficult because of the high initial
investment required to hire and train an exclusive agency force. Entry as
a direct writer is somewhat easier because the marketing staff is smaller
and requires less training and experience.
The lack of an existing policyholder base is a formidable entry
barrier, because of a phenomenon known as the aging effect. Aging
means that policyholders who have been insured with the company for
several years have lower loss ratios than policyholders with similar
underwriting characteristics who have been insured only for a short
time. The aging effect arises as a result of information asymmetries. The
insurer learns a great deal about a policyholder by insuring him or her
over a period of years. This is inherently private information that is not
transferred to subsequent insurers if the policyholder switches compa-
nies. Newly underwritten policies inevitably include a higher propor-
tion of "bad" risks than the company’s existing base. Thus, a new
entrant, with no existing book of business, will face higher loss costs
than insurers currently in the market.
If they have the determination and the cash to overcome the aging
problem, financial service firms provide a significant source of potential
entry into property-liability insurance. Several large life insurance
companies have successfully entered the market. At present banks are
not permitted by federal banking law to offer insurance, but this
situation is likely to change in the near future.
Existing property-liability insurers provide another important
source of entry. These are likely to be firms that have specialized in
particular lines of business or geographical areas but decide to expand
into new markets. They are likely to have underwriting expertise,
capitalization, and licenses and thus can enter relatively quickly. State
Farm’s entry in the 1970s into commercial multiple peril provides a case
in point.
It is noteworthy that the existence of rating bureaus facilitates entry
into property-liability insurance by providing cost and underwriting
information as well as policy forms to new entrants. If the pooling of
data were not permitted, the costs of entry would be higher.
lo A recent survey by Independent Agent magazine showed that agents place from 50 to
60 percent of their business with the lead company.THE PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY 135
Even though entry barriers and costs are reasonably low in prop-
erty-liability insurance, the costs of exit may be relatively high, partic-
ularly in certain markets. In a politicized rate-making environment,
firms may be unable to earn a fair rate of return. If this continues over
a sufficient period of time, the insurer is likely to try to withdraw from
the market. However, a number of jurisdictions have been successful in
forcing insurers to continue to write particular lines of business in order
to retain their licenses to write other lines. Even if the company is
successful in exiting, it may be required to continue to participate in
funding deficits in the state’s residual market. Thus, exit is neither
unrestricted nor costless. Potential solutions to this problem include
more rational regulation, deregulation, and/or fewer restrictions on exit.
The number of firms entering and exiting the property-liability
insurance industry from 1981 through 1989 is shown in Figure 5.11 The
figure shows that entries exceeded exits in every year except 1984, the
low point of the liability crisis. Cumulative net entry over the period
amounted to about 260 firms. The 1989 market share of firms entering
the industry in the period 1981-89 is shown in Figure 6. New entrants
account for 5 to 10 percent of premium volume in most lines of
insurance. The exception is malpractice, where new entrants accounted
for 22 percent of total writings. It seems reasonable to conclude that
entry into insurance is relatively unrestricted and that threat of entry is
likely to deter any significant departures from competitive pricing.
Prices, Profits, and Financial Condition
The typical property-liability insurance policy agrees to reimburse
the insured for losses covered under the terms of the policy. The loss
payment is triggered by a contingent event such as a fire, an accident, or
a potential liability suit. In return for the insurer’s promises, the
policyholder pays a premium. Because a time lag nearly always occurs
between the premium payment and loss payment dates, the competitive
insurance premium is the present value of the losses, expenses, and
taxes arising out of the insurance transaction.
The insurance company provides a mechanism whereby buyers of
insurance can pool risk. Risk pooling permits buyers to transfer an
uncertain and potentially large loss amount to the insurance pool in
return for a certain, smaller payment, the premium. However, even for
11 Entry is defined here as an instance where a firm writing no business in a given line
of insurance (that is, premiums written = 0) begins to write business in a given year. Exit
is defined as a firm going from positive writings to zero writings. These entries could be
new firms, existing insurers, or other financial service firms.136 J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
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large risk pools, losses will never exactly equal the expectedvalue but
are always greater or less than this amount. Because of the possibility
that losses will be greater than expected, insurance companies must
maintain equity, often referred to in insurance as policyholders’ surplus.
Equity provides a financial cushion so that losses can be paid even if
larger than expected. Of course, even for well-capitalized insurers,
equity does not provide complete protection from ruin. In a well-
functioning insurance market, equity levels are sufficient to maintain
ruin probabilities at "acceptable" levels. Ultimately, the level of equity
and the probability of ruin are endogenous to the market: "safer"
insurance costs more and buyers receive the level of safety they are
willing to purchase.
The Supply of Insurance
Insurance companies will be present to provide insurance as long as
equity capital is available. And capital will be available in efficient capital
markets if it earns a fair rate of return, that is, a rate of return commensu-
rate with the risk of writing insurance. Equity capital in insurance has
several sources: new capital issues in securities markets, contributions of
capital by stockholders, contributions by policyholders, and retained earn-
ings.THE PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY 137
Figure 6 1989 Market Share of Entrants
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Direct issuance of new capital in securities markets is used infre-
quently by insurers. One reason for this is that few insurers are publicly
traded. Of the more than 600 stock insurance companies and groups,
only about 40 are publicly traded. A few stock insurers are closely held
or owned by management. Most, however, are owned by other publicly
traded firms, either diversified financial services firms or nonfinancial
corporations.
Although the lack of direct access to capital markets would seem to
limit the ability of most stock insurers to raise capital, this is actually not
the case. Ownership of stock insurers by other firms may facilitate
capital issue. One problem that a publicly traded stock insurer faces
when issuing capital is that of asymmetric information. Insurer account-
ing statements are difficult to evaluate, and even highly trained evalu-
ators cannot determine the accuracy of loss reserves and other accounts,
let alone the firm’s business prospects, without additional information
that generally is not circulated outside the company itself. Thus, the
market is likely to require an additional risk premium when issuing138 J. David Culmnins and Mary A. Weiss
capital to publicly traded insurers, raising the cost of capital above its
true value. The insurer’s management is much more likely to reveal
confidential information to a parent corporation than to the securities
market. One reason is that adverse information released to the market
also becomes available to regulators, who may impose additional
regulatory costs on the firm. The parent is likely to incur a smaller
"information tax" than the insurer would directly because the parent
faces the risk that the cost of capital will increase for its other operations
if it attempts to deceive the market about the financial prospects of its
insurance subsidiary. Thus, ownership of insurers by conglomerates or
holding companies rather than directly by the public internalizes infor-
mation asymmetries and reduces the cost of capital. More equity enters
the industry through contributions by parent corporations than by direct
public equity issues.
Mutual insurers do not have the option of issuing capital directly in
securities markets.12 The policyholders provide the primary source of
new outside equity for most mutuals. However, because of the lack of
control over management in the typical mutual and the inability to cash
in the ownership right by selling shares, policyholders are not a viable
source of new capital in most instances. Medical mutuals, where
policyholders maintain more control over management, are an excep-
tion; but in general mutuals are disadvantaged in their ability to raise
capital.
The sources of new equity in property-liability insurance are shown
in Figure 7. The primary source of capital is retained earnings. In nearly
all years from 1976 to 1989, a net addition was made to capital from
retained earnings and an outflow of capital occurred as dividends to the
capital providers. Only between 1984 and 1986, when the industry was
attempting to recover from the insurance crisis, did a net inflow of
external capital occur.13 This indicates that the insurance and equity
markets were functioning appropriately during this period; that is,
insurers were able to recover from the crisis relatively quickly by
obtaining funds from shareholders.14 It also implies that shareholders
believed that fair returns on writing insurance were possible, at least for
some coverages.
12 There are some exceptions to this. A few mutuals have formed downstream stock
companies that make public equity issues. During the 1980s, regulators permitted some
mutuals to issue Eurobonds and count them as equity rather than debt. These are rather
unusual circumstances and do not provide a consistent source of new capital.
13 External capital equals capital and surplus paid in, less stockholder dividends.
14 Although Figure 7 includes mutuals as well as stock companies, nearly all of the net










1976 1977 !978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989
Source: A. M. Best Co. data tapes.
Insurance Prices
Insurance economists are plagued by the general unavailability of
accurate data on insurance prices. Insurer financial statements contain
no information on the number of exposures. Some data on price per
exposure unit are available on auto and homeowners insurance, but
these data do not provide information on particular rating territories
within states.
Faced with these obstacles, economists have developed two pri-
mary measures of price: the inverse loss ratio, and the economic
premium ratio. The inverse loss ratio is simply the ratio of premiums
earned to losses incurred. The rationale is that the objective of insurance
is to redistribute losses, and the price for this service is the premium.
Hence, the price relative to value received is the ratio of premiums to
losses. While this is a useful measure in cross-sectional studies, it is less
useful for time series analyses because premiums reflect the present
value of policy cash flows whereas reported losses are undiscounted.
Thus, if interest rates rise, the inverse loss ratio declines but this does
not necessarily mean that prices have declined.
Because of the limitations of the inverse loss ratio, economists have140 J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
recently developed the economic premium ratio (Harrington 1988; "
Winter 1990; and Cummins and Danzon 1990).15 This is the ratio of
premiums to the discounted value of losses. To obtain the discounted
value, one needs to know the payout pattern and the discount rate.
Research on these variables is ongoing, but the best current approach is
to use the Taylor method (Lemaire 1985) to compute the payout pattern
and the U.S. treasury yield curve as the discount rate. Most analysts
agree that it is appropriate to use accident year losses, representing
losses for accidents occurring during a particular calendar year, rather
than calendar year losses, which include the effects of revaluations of
loss reserves for prior claims. Some controversy exists about the appro-
priate numerator. Harrington (1988) recommends premiums earned,
while Cummins and Danzon (1990) use premiums written. The objec-
tion to premiums earned is that it represents an average price over a
two-year period, which is then inappropriately compared to losses from
the current period. On the other hand, using premiums written intro-
duces a potential error due to growth of the exposure base. Ideally, this
problem would be solved if the National Association of Insurance
Commissioners (NAIC) required insurers to report more useful data. A
variant of the economic premium ratio is the Myers-Cohn price, which
is the present value of losses plus the present value of federal income
taxes incurred by the insurer as a result of writing a given block of
policies. 16
Analysis of insurance prices using the economic premium ratio
shows that nearly all of the increase in liability insurance prices during
the 1984-85 crisis can be explained in terms of underlying cost factors. In
particular, accident year losses increased substantially over this period
and interest rates fell.17 In 1985, when the largest increase in general
liability prices took place, nearly all of the increase was due to loss and
interest rate changes.
Pricing formulas such as the economic premium ratio can be used to
analyze the controversial issue of cash flow underwriting, which occurs
when insurers slash prices to obtain funds to invest during periods of
high interest rates. This practice is alleged to destabilize markets and
cause insurance crises. In fact, price reductions (increases) in response
to rising (falling) interest rates are the expected outcome in a competitive
insurance market. The price of insurance is the present value of losses,
expenses, and taxes. Although most expenses are paid early in the
~5 Some economists use the economic loss ratio, which is the inverse of the premium
ratio.
16 The original formula appears in Myers and Cohn (1987). Cummins (1990) presents
a version of the Myers-Cohn formula that is more convenient computationally.
17 Subsequent loss analysis reveals that insurers did not overestimate losses for 1984
and 1985 but did overestimate 1986 accident year losses by about 12 percent.THE PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY 141
policy period, loss and tax flows cover a considerable period of time in
some lines of insurance; and the present value of the policy cash flows
may be significantly less than their nominal undiscounted value. "Cash
flow underwriting" is a problem only if price competition becomes
excessive.
Two indices of the responsiveness of premiums to interest rates are
the pricing factor and the duration. The pricing factor is simply the
present value of the loss-payout-tail proportions. It is multiplied by
losses incurred to obtain the present value of losses for use in the
economic premium ratio. The pricing factors in several key insurance
lines are shown in the top panel of Table 4. For example, the pricing
factor for general liability in 1980 was 0.603: This means that the present
value of losses incurred is 0.603 times their nominal value. The pricing
factors for long-tail lines such as malpractice, general liability, and
workers’ compensation are much lower than for shorter-tailed lines like
homeowners. Prices in the former lines can be expected to be more
responsive to interest rates. The general liability pricing factor increased
by 12 percent in 1985 and by 11 percent in 1986. Thus, premiums would
have risen by those amounts even if nominal losses had remained
constant.
The duration is a measure of the interest rate elasticity of the
present value of losses. Specifically, it is equal to -1 times the elasticity
of the pricing factor with respect to the discount factor (1 + r), where
r = the discount rate. An increase in interest rates from 7 percent to 9.14
percent represents a 2 percentage point increase in the discount factor,
(1 + r). Such a change would lead to an 8 percent drop in the pricing
factor in a line with a duration of 4. The highest interest rate durations
are in liability lines such as general liability and malpractice. General
liability durations are in the neighborhood of 4 and malpractice dura-
tions often exceed 4.5. Private passenger auto liability has a duration of
2.5, whereas the homeowners duration is around 1. It is normal for
competitive insurance prices to respond to changes in interest rates, and
the proportionate response varies significantly among lines.
Although "’cash flow underwriting" is normal in competitive mar-
kets, it is still possible that insurers underpriced during the early 1980s,
precipitating the crisis of 1984-85. This issue has been investigated by
Danzon and Harrington (1990), who find weak evidence of underpricing
in the general liability insurance market in the early 1980s. They
attribute this to the "winner’s curse" phenomenon, whereby the win-
ners in markets consisting of unbiased bidders will be the firms that bid
too low in any particular situation. Excessive risk-taking by naive or
go-for-broke firms also may have contributed to underpricing during
this period. Their strongest finding, however, is that the general liability
price increases of the mid 1980s primarily reflected underlying cost
factors.142 J. David Cummins and Many A. Weiss
Table 4
Pricing Factors and Durations, Selected Lines of Property-Liability Insurance
Pricing Factors
Private Pass. Commercial Home- Commercial General Medical Workers’
Year Auto Liabil. Auto Liabil. owners Multiple Peril Liability Malpractice Comp.
,823 .754 .893 .790 .603 .524 .710
,787 .708 .868 .751 .550 .473 .669
.801 ,722 .881 .764 .559 .481 .681
.837 ,767 .904 ,802 .614 ,534 .722
.813 .735 ,890 .776 ,572 ,493 .693
.858 .792 .919 .823 ,642 .561 .744
.886 .834 .935 .858 .710 .629 .784
.877 .821 .930 .847 .687 .605 .771
.869 .811 .924 .838 .676 .595 ,762












Private Pass. Commercial Home- Commercial General Medical Workers’
Year Auto Liabil. Auto Liabil. owners Multiple Peril Liability Malpractice Comp.
1980 1.607 2.325 .939 1,865 4.005 4.553 2.276
1981 1.565 2.260 .917 1.793 3.874 4,419 2.185
1982 1,567 2.259 .919 1.793 3.858 4,398 2.180
1983 1,611 2,328 .942 1.870 3,997 4.541 2.277
1984 1.577 2.272 .924 1.807 3.871 4.408 2.194
1885 1.631 2.358 ,954 1.903 4.049 4.591 2.315
1986 1.684 2.449 .982 2.010 4.292 4.853 2,471
1987 1.666 2.419 .972 1.974 4.209 4.763 2.417
1988 1.660 2.409 .968 1,962 4.186 4,739 2.401
1989 1.666 2,424 .971 1,981 4.254 4.817 2.438
Mean 1.623 2.350 .949 1.896 4.059 4.608 2.315
Source: A. M. BestCo, 1990. Best~ Aggrega~sand AveNges;authors’calculations.
Standard economic theory strongly suggests that firms should not
be able to engage in retroactive loss loading. That is, prices for any given
block of policies should reflect the cost factors for those policies; insurers
should not be able to charge off prior pricing errors to future policyhold-
ers. New entrants or rival firms could be expected to undercut a
retroactive price while earning a fair rate of return on the incoming
policy cohort.
Although the arguments against retroactive loss loading are fairly
strong, Cummins and Danzon (1990) suggest that retroactivity may be
feasible in some insurance markets and, in fact, may be necessary if
firms are to participate in the markets on a long-term basis. They use an
option pricing model of the insurance firm to analyze the following
scenario: (1) An adverse loss or investment shock occurs that moves theTHE PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY 143
insurer significantly away from its target safety level. The target safety
level is hypothesized to exist because buyer clienteles demand specific
levels of safety from their insurers. Buyers wishing to deal with an A+
insurer are likely to go elsewhere if the company becomes a B+ insurer.
(2) The insurer would like to raise new capital to return to its target
safety level. However, it cannot do so by charging competitively fair
premiums to the incoming cohort because any improvement in the
safety level increases the value of the outstanding reserves to prior
policyholders. Prior policyholders receive this improvement for free
because they cannot be charged additional premiums. Thus, incoming
equity will be penalized, and capital providers will be reluctant to
supply new equity. (3) The insurer raises prices above competitive levels
to the incoming policyholder cohort, raises new equity, which is not
penalized because of the higher insurance prices, and returns to the
target safety level. Prices then return to competitive levels. The insurer
can charge noncompetitive premiums because it holds private informa-
tion on its policyholders, implying that they face non-trivial costs of
switching to another insurer. It does not exploit this information during
normal market periods because demand elasticity would lead to subop-
timal sales volume.
The Cummins-Danzon hypothesis implies that retroactive loss
loading may be necessary in an otherwise competitive insurance market
to maintain insurer safety at the level demanded by buyers. Cummins
and Danzon provide some empirical evidence supporting the hypothe-
sis. However, given the contrast between this hypothesis and conven-
tional economic theory, more evidence will be needed before any firm
conclusions can be drawn. The hypothesis does not necessarily imply
that insurers have weak incentives to settle claims efficiently. Insurers
that control their losses and expenses still should be more successful
than those that do not. One of the factors that impedes switching
following a loss shock is that losses are highly correlated across the
industry, so that the firm and its rivals experience the need for
additional capital at about the same time. A firm that consistently raises
prices to cover loss or expense inefficiencies is likely to lose out during
normal markets and will have to raise prices more than its rivals
following a shock.
Profitability
Public policy discussions of insurance are often based on misinfor-
mation about profitability in the industry. The points of view range from
that of the insurers, who have been successful in convincing many
business analysts that they consistently lose large sums of money, to
that of extremist public interest groups who claim that insurers are144 ]. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
financially viable as long as cash inflows are greater than cash outflows.
The truth, not surprisingly, lies somewhere in between.
Various rule-of-thumb profit measures are used in property-liability
insurance. Most of these convey some useful information about insur-
ance markets. The problem is that their limitations are often overlooked,
resulting in incorrect conclusions about profitability. Two important
"trade ratios" are the combined ratio and the overall operating ratio. The
combined ratio is the sum of the loss ratio, the ratio of losses incurred to
premiums earned, and the expense ratio, the ratio of expenses to
premiums written. It is widely used as a measure of underwriting
profitability: if the combined ratio is above 1.0, the implication is that
losses and expenses exceed premiums. This obviously provides a
misleading indication of profitability because it does not take investment
income into account. The overall operating ratio was introduced as a
way to correct the combined ratio for investment income. The operating
ratio is the combined ratio minus the ratio of investment income
attributable to a particular line of business to premiums earned.18 It is ¯
analogous to the return on sales measure used in other industries.
During the 1980s, the overall industry combined ratio ranged from
1.03 in 1980 to 1.18 in 1984. Of course, because the denominators of the
two components of the ratio reflect market discounting, while the
numerators do not, the ratio varies with interest rates. It is not correct to
conclude that relatively high combined ratios necessarily mean that
returns in insurance are too low. The operating ratio ranged from 0.956
in 1987 to 1.074 in 1984. This ratio is more reliable, but an operating ratio
above 1.0 does not necessarily reveal unprofitable operations, because
the ratio is a rather crude approximation to the more appropriate dis-
counted cash flow calculation.
A better measure of the rate of return in a line of insurance is the
internal rate of return, the rate of return that sets the discounted cash
flows from a project equal to zero. It is compared with the target rate of
return, or cost of capital, to determine whether the rate of return on the
project is acceptable. Usually, the project is acceptable if the internal rate
of return exceeds the cost of capital.19 One difficulty in applying this rate
to measure insurance profits is that publicly available sources do not
contain information on the timing of premium flows in various lines of
insurance. Another problem is knowing how much of the company’s
equity should be allocated to each line. These are solvable problems; for
example, the NAIC could require insurers to release information on
la Investment income is usually allocated by line on the basis of reserves.
19 For some cash flow streams the decision criterion is reversed, that is, one accepts
the project if the internal rate of return is less than the cost of capital. See Brealey and
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premium flow patterns, and researchers will develop theoretically
correct techniques to allocate surplus. The analysis of insurance markets
would be substantially improved if the internal rate of return were
eventually adopted as a standard profit measure. It is already being used
by several jurisdictions in rate regulation.2°
As part of the study reported in this paper, the authors calculated
industrywide internal rates of return for six major lines of insurance for
the period 1980 to 1989. Surplus was allocated by line on the basis of
reserves using the ratio of industrywide reserves to surplus in each year.
The accident year loss ratio and the expense ratio appropriate for each
line in each year were used as inputs into the model. Investment returns
were based on current market rates, and a weighted average was
obtained using the industrywide asset portfolio proportions for each
year. Tax rates specific to each asset were used to compute an after-tax
investment return. Underwriting profits taxes (tax credits) were ob-
tained using the appropriate IRS discount factor for years subsequent to
1986 and the prior tax rules for the years 1980 to 1986. Loss flows were
extracted from the indugtrywide Schedule P using the Taylor method.
The insurance internal rate of return model is explained in Cummins
(1990) .21
The results are presented in Table 5. The table generally reveals
high rates of return in the early 1980s, attributable to high interest rates
and relatively favorable underwriting ratios. The internal rates of return
exceeded 20 percent for two or more of these years in general liability,
personal auto liability, and workers’ compensation. The returns then
decline approaching the crisis years of 1984 and 1985. Following the
crisis, the returns in general liability and commercial multiple peril
recover to more normal levels. However, returns in workers" compen-
sation remain relatively low, while returns in private passenger auto
continue to decline. The auto and workers’ compensation results in the
late 1980s are not surprising, because these lines have been subjected to
intense regulatory scrutiny and increasingly restrictive rate regulation.
Less heavily regulated lines such as general liability bounced back more
quickly to more normal profit levels. The auto and workers’ compensa-
tion findings suggest that supply problems in these markets may be on
the horizon.
2o The internal rate of return has been introduced, usually by insurers, in several
states including Maine, Pennsylvania, and Virginia. A similar technique, the Myers-Cohn
model, is used in Massachusetts.
21 Premium flows were assumed by the authors. Changing these flows generally
would affect the levels of the internal rates of return but not the patterns across years.
Nevertheless, the results should be viewed as a first attempt at calculating marketwide
internal rates of return profitability in insurance. Suggestions for refining the calculations
would be appreciated.146 J. David Cummins and Many A. Weiss
Table 5
















Source: A, M. Best Co.
CAPM
Private Commercial Costs
Pass. Auto Commercial Home- Multiple General Workers’ of
Liabil. Auto Liabil, owners Peril Liability Comp. Capital
29.1 18.9 10,8 23.0 23.3 23.6 19.8
30,2 19.1 20.6 19.0 25,2 27.8 23.4
26.5 13,9 16.2 11.3 19,8 25.6 18.8
19.5 7.0 12.7 4.5 13.4 15.7 17.1
18.7 4.6 9.2 ,7 12.2 13.0 18.2
13.6 7.3 -,4 4.2 10.7 11.7 15.9
10,3 10.8 8.2 20.7 13.4 7.8 14.6
10.1 13,2 25.1 38.8 14.1 13.5 13,9
9.5 12,5 15.6 26.8 14,4 13.3 14.7
8.4 9.7 -7.1 10.3 14,3 13.1 16.7
17.6 11.7 11.1 15.9 16.1 16.5 17.3
8.1 4.6 9.0 11.3 4.7 6.4 2.7
(various years); Ibbotson Associates (1990); authors’ calculations.
To determine whether the internal rates of return are reasonable, a
cost of capital or "hurdle rate" is needed. Although estimation of costs
of capital by line is impeded by data limitations (see Cummins and
Harrington 1987), it is relatively easy to estimate overall company costs
of capital. Since the beta of the insurance industry tends to average
around 1.0, an approximate cost of capital can be obtained using the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) with Treasury bill rates and market
risk premia obtained from Ibbotson Associates (1990). The results are
shown in the last column of Table 5. The internal rates of return for
personal auto, workers" compensation, and general liability are close to
the CAPM costs of capital from 1980 to 1982 and generally fall below the
CAPM in 1983 to 1986. Thereafter, general liability returns recover to the
CAPM level, while personal auto and workers’ compensation returns do
not. Commercial multiple peril follows a pattern similar to general
liability, while homeowners and commercial auto have generally lower
returns. Because risk varies by line, it is not necessarily true that returns
close to the CAPM are adequate or that returns below the CAPM are
inadequate. Nevertheless, the results suggest that most of the unregu-
lated commercial lines are earning adequate returns, while more tightly
regulated lines are under-earning.
In order to maintain insurance supply, insurers must be able to earn
returns commensurate with their risk. If regulation prevents insurersTHE PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY 147
from earning a fair return, market availability problems will develop.
Another way to determine whether returns are adequate is to calculate
the return on equity for firms in the industry. Unfortunately, significant
confusion exists about the measurement of returns in insurance. Ideally,
a market return measure would be used, but only a few companies have
traded securities. Consequently, for most firms, book return measures
must be used. But book return measures are likely to be poor indicators
of the true return on equity because of insurance accounting practices.
For example, reserves are reported at undiscounted values while bonds
are reported at amortized cost. An accurate book return measure would
correct for these and other accounting anomalies. Facilitating the com-
putation of more meaningful book return estimates should be a regula-
tory priority. Another problem with accounting return analyses in
insurance is that the insurance industry insists on ignoring unrealized
capital gains. In reality, however, both realized and unrealized capital
gains are legitimate components of the return on equity and should not
be omitted.
Three book and two market rate of return measures are presented in
Table 6. The book return measures are the statutory return on equity
and two GAAP (generally accepted accounting principles) measures.
The statutory return is based on regulatory accounting procedures. It
consists of statutory net income, which includes realized but not
unrealized capital gains, divided by average statutory surplus. This is
the return measure used most often by insurers and regulators. On the
average, the statutory return on equity was 12.6 percent from 1976 to
1989. The statutory return has been used by California and other states
in establishing target rates of return for regulatory purposes. This is
unfortunate, because this return measure does not correct for statutory
accounting anomalies and is biased downward due to the omission of
unrealized capital gains.
Two GAAP rates of return are presented, including and excluding
capital gains. When capital gains are excluded, the average GAAP
return is the same as the average statutory return, 12.6 percent. When
capital gains are included, however, the average return is 14.3 percent,
which is closer to the expected CAPM return for a stock with a beta of
1~. It is clearly inappropriate for regulators to omit realized capital gains
when computing regulatory hurdle rates.
The two market rates of return are based on the A.M. Best Com-
pany’s insurance stock price indices. Although these indices are not
ideal for various technical reasons, they do provide an indication of the
market returns on property-liability insurance stocks. According to the
market measures, property-liability insurance stocks registered an av-
erage rate of return of 17 percent, while multiple line stocks earned 12.1
percent from 1976 to 1989. The average of these two returns, 14.5
percent, is close to the GAAP return including unrealized capital gains.148 J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
Table 6
Rate of Return on Equity in the Property-Liability Insurance Industry
Percent
GAAP GAAP Market Property- Market
Year Statutory No RCGs With RCGs Liability Multi-Line
1976 11,4 11.4 19,3 25.5 42,1
1977 23.0 21.3 18,6 -4.1 -5,0
1978 21.9 20.2 21.0 5.1 8.9
1979 18.2 16.7 20.9 29.3 21.7
1980 15.5 14.3 20.1 11.1 9.4
1981 12.9 12.0 8.8 21.0 13.2
1982 9.5 9.1 12.4 26.6 -3.2
1983 8.8 8.5 10,0 10.1 10,1
1984 1.3 1.9 -1.0 4.8 11.8
1985 2.6 4.3 9.2 50.0 45.9
1986 15.0 15.1 16.7 9,7 -4.6
1987 13.8 16.7 14.8 -7,1 -15.4
1988 13.4 14.5 16.0 11.5 2.9
1989 9.7 10.2 14.0 43.9 31.5
Mean 12.6 12.6 14.3 17.0 12.1
8tandard
Deviation 6.0 5.3 5.9 16.1 17.3
Note: ROE = return on equity, GAAP = generally accepted accounting principles, RCGs = realized
capital gains.
Source: GAAP ROE = Insurance Services Office. Statutory R©E = A. M. Best Co. Market returns =
A. M. Best stock indices.
The conclusion is that great care must be taken in estimating prices
and rates of return in insurance. The imperfections of rule-of-thumb
measures such as the combined ratio and operating ratio should be
recognized, and analysts should strive to compute more accurate
estimates based on models that appropriately recognize the timing of
policy cash flows. Regulators should abandon statutory accounting for
rate of return purposes and should not ignore unrealized capital gains.
Financial Condition
Recent failures of both life and property-liability insurers have
focused attention on the financial condition of the insurance industry.
This section presents some key solvency data on property-liability
insurance.
The financial condition of property-liability insurance companies is
evaluated annually by the NAIC using a series of 11 audit ratios
comprising its Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS). Insurers
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regulatory scrutiny. Although the audit ratios are reasonably good
predictors of failure, they are far from perfect. The ratios have not been
updated over time, and weak insurers have become adept at concealing
their financial condition. Nonetheless, the NAIC ratios remain an
important solvency indicator.
Table 7 summarizes the results of the NAIC audit ratio tests for
1989. The NAIC evaluates companies and major groups separately. The
companies that are members of the groups are included in the company
tests so some overlap occurs between the two samples. Both the
company and group results are shown in Table 7.
The table reveals that 6.4 percent of the companies and 7 percent of
the groups failed four or more tests. On some tests, such as the two-year
operating ratio, the change in surplus, and two-year reserve develop-
ment, the failure rate was considerably higher. For example, the surplus
test shows that 13.5 percent of companies experienced a decline in
surplus of more than 10 percent or an increase of more than 50 percent.
Both are considered adverse indicators because they reveal deteriorating
capitalization and/or balance sheet manipulation. Because test results
are not readily available for prior years, it is difficult to say whether the
industry’s financial condition has deteriorated. However, the failure rate
on several of the tests suggests that further investigation is in order.
Leverage ratios are important indicators of an industry’s financial
condition. Five leverage ratios for property-liability insurance are pre-
sented in Table 8. The premiums to surplus ratio, the most widely used
leverage ratio in insurance, has been shown to be a good predictor of
insolvency. Although companies pass the IRIS test if this ratio is less
than 3.0, most companies strive for a ratio of 2.0 or less. The premiums
to surplus ratio for the industry as a whole declined during the late
1980s, reaching its lowest level in more than 15 years in 1989. The loss
reserve to surplus ratio is slightly higher now than during the late 1970s
and early 1980s but does not appear to be excessive. The ratios of total
reserves to surplus and liabilities to surplus also are in the normal
ranges.
The last ratio in Table 8 is the ratio of reinsurance receivables to
surplus. These receivables are premium or loss payments owed by
reinsurance partners. Receivables may not be collectible in a financial
crisis if the reinsurer fails. Some insurers tend to use overly optimistic
assessments of reinsurance receivables to bolster their balance sheets.
This ratio poses some cause for concern because it has been higher
during the 1980s than during the late 1970s. Since many reinsurers are
virtually unregulated, regulators have shown substantial concern that
reinsurance may prove to be the Achilles heel of the property-liability
industry. The receivables ratio suggests that further research on this
topic might be of value in monitoring industry financial condition.
Junk bonds have recently played a major role in the failure of large150 J. David Cum~nins and Mary A. Weiss
Table 7
Insurance Regulatory Information System (IRIS)Test Results for 1989
Percentage of Insurers Failing to Meet a Ratio Test
Property-Liability Property-Liability
Insurance Companies Insurance Groups
Ratio Test (N = 2377) (N = 157)
Premium to Surplus
Fail if Result >300% 5.2 7.1
Change in Writings
Fail if Result >33%




Surplus Aid to Surplus
Fail if Result >25%
Two-Year Operating Ratio
Fail if Result >100%
Investment Yield
Fail if Result <5%
Change in Surplus
Fail if Result <-10%





Liabilities to Liquid Assets
Fail if Result >105%
Agents’ Balance to Surplus
Fail if Result >40%
One-Year Reserve Development
Fail if Result >25%
Two-Year Reserve Development
Fail if Result >25%
Estimated Reserve Deficiency to Policyholder
Surplus
Fail if Result >25% 6.9 8.9
Percentage of Insurers Failing 4 or More
Ratio Tests 6.4 7.0
Notes: 100% minus Operating Ratio is the Profit Percentage. Reserve Development Tests indicate
r~serve inadequacy as a percentage of estimated reserves from a prior period (e.g., one year, two years).
Source: National Association of Insurance Commissioners.
life insurance companies. If the statutory accounting statements can be
believed, junk bonds are not a serious problem for the property-liability
insurance industry as a whole, although they may be a problem for
some individual insurers. Industrywide, the regulatory statements
show that property-liability insurers held only $4.6 billion in non-
investment-grade bonds or bonds at or near default in 1989. ThisTHE PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY 151
Table 8
Leverage Ratios for Property-Liability Insurance Industry
Reinsurance
Premiums Loss Reserve Total Reserves Liabilities Receivables
Year " To Surplus To Surplus To Surplus To Surplus To Surplus
1976 2.41 1.87 2.86 3.21 ,05
1977 2.44 1.91 2.87 3.27 ,05
1978 2.28 1,92 2.79 3.19 .06
1979 2.10 1,89 2.70 3.07 .06
1980 1.82 1,77 2.46 2.79 .06
1981 1,83 1.90 2,60 2,95 .07
1982 1,71 1.85 2.51 2.85 .08
1983 1.66 1.86 2,51 2,81 .08
1984 1.86 2.11 2.83 3,15 .11
1985 1.92 2.05 2.81 3.13 .11
1986 1.88 1.96 2.67 2.97 .11
1987 1.86 2.09 2.79 3.10 .11
1988 1.71 2.04 2.69 3.04 .10
1989 1.56 2,01 2.61 2.93 ,10
Mean 1.93 1.95 2.69 3,03 .08
Source: A, M. Best Co. (Various years). Best’s Aggregates and Averages.
represents 1.5 percent of the total bond portfolio or 3.4 percent of
industry equity. The potential problem, of course, is that some compa-
nies’ classifications of bonds as investment grade may be overly opti-
mistic and/or that their investment grade bonds are at the lower end of
the quality range. Thus, the regulatory statements may mask significant
bond default risk.
The insolvency problem among property-liability insurers seems to
have improved somewhat since its peak in 1985. The number of
insolvencies rose from four in 1980 to 25 in 1985 and the total assess-
ments for companies going insolvent in each year rose from $38 million
in 1980 to a high of $909 million in 1985. However, both the number of
insolvencies and the level of assessments have tapered off somewhat in
1988 and 1989. Fourteen insurers became insolvent in 1989, leading to
assessments of $246 million. The total assessments for companies
becoming insolvent in 1989 amounted to only two-tenths of I percent of
industry equity.
Based on the readily available data, it seems difficult to argue that
the property-liability insurance industry faces an unmanageable insol-
vency problem. However, the publicly available data may mask some
serious problems. Extensive additional research would be needed to
determine whether insurers actually pose a solvency threat of savings-
and-loan-industry magnitude.152 J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss
Summary and Conclusions
The property-liability insurance industry is under attack by regula-
tors, legislators, consumer groups, and the public. Insurers are held
largely responsible for premium inflation in automobile insurance and
other lines. They are said to have caused the liability crisis of 1984-85
through irrational pricing and to have increased premiums to unreason-
able levels once the crisis developed. Insurers are accused of conspiracy
and collusion, and are alleged to be grossly inefficient in marketing,
administration, and loss control. Perhaps their worst offense is that they
are about to become insolvent in large numbers and thereby engulf the
nation in a serious financial crisis.
The analysis presented in this paper reveals little support for these
allegations. The property-liability insurance industry is competitively
structured, with numerous firms compefing for business in most lines.
Entry barriers appear to be low and the number of firms in the industry
continues to increase. Internal rates of return and returns on equity
appear to be reasonable. During most recent years, insurance prices
appear to have responded appropriately to changes in interest rates and
to increased loss and tax payments. Publicly available data offer no clear
indication of an impending insolvency crisis.
These comments not withstanding, serious problems need to be
addressed. Among them are the following: (1) Availability and afford-
ability of auto insurance. To a significant extent, this problem is beyond
the control of the insurance industry. The real problem is the increasing
frequency and severity of bodily injury claims and the rising severity of
property damage claim costs. A partial solution is to provide insurers
more incentives to control claim costs, for example, by mandating the
creation of industrywide fraud bureaus. However, the auto insurance
problem cannot be solved until the liability system is brought under
control. Elective no-fault insurance provides one way to do this. (2) The
underwriting cycle and the causes of insurance crises are still not fully
understood, impeding effective public policy measures. More research is
needed to identify the sources of these problems, but this will require
better data, which should become a regulatory priority. (3) The use of
inappropriate profitability measures has led to widespread confusion
and irrational actions by regulators. Appropriate measures are available
and should be used. (4) Rate regulation is unlikely to solve the problems
of insurance availability and affordability. More likely, restrictive regu-
lation will exacerbate these problems. Regulators should focus on more
effective monitoring of prices and profits. (5) The present system of
solvency surveillance and monitoring is inadequate. The regulators are
not able to tell us the extent of the industry’s junk bond problem and
persist in using antiquated accounting rules and regulatory techniques.
More intelligently designed items of information in the regulatoryTHE PROPERTY-LIABILITY INSURANCE INDUSTRY 153
statement would add immeasurably to our understanding of the indus-
try. It is not apparent that federal regulation is the answer; but clearly
something should be done to improve the solvency system.
Considering the combined effects of cost inflation, crises, and
regulatory ineptitude, the property-liability insurance industry remains
remarkably healthy. History has shown that intrusive regulation is more
likely to create problems than to solve them. Regulation should be
improved and focused on those areas, such as solvency surveillance,
where it can do the most good. The primary role of the regulator should
be to provide information to the market rather than to attempt to
exercise control.
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Roger S. Joslin*
J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss have written an interesting
and enlightening essay. The paper for the most part accurately describes
what we see today in the marketplace of the property-liability insurance
industry.
To paraphrase and to provide the framework for my response:
(1) insurance is an intensely competitive business; (2) the rhetoric of
affordability, availability, insurance cycles, and profit measurement
could stand some light along with the heat; (3) insurance rate regulation
should observe the provision of the Hippocratic oath that says "Do no
harm"; and (4) while a solvency crisis does not exist for property and
liability insurers, the mechanisms for measurement and assurance of
solvency should be strengthened.
Competition--Guess Who Suppresses It?
Competition in property and liability insurance is intense. Compe-
tition, like democracy, does not always yield ideal results. New prob-
lems emerge, however, each time either system is modified in an
attempt to improve the results.
As the authors point out, the number of insurers is large, minimum
capital required for entry is low, and technology is not a major factor in
the business. Of course, easy entry is meaningless if exit is nearly
*Senior Vice President and Treasurer, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Company; Chairman of the Board, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company.156 Roger S. ]oslin
impossible. Who holds insurers hostage and imposes multi-million-
dollar exit taxes?
In some markets price ceilings are imposed. How many cars would
Mercedes-Benz try to sell at Volkswagen prices? Even Volkswagen
might hesitate to expand its market if every car sold carried with it a
burden of selling a Mercedes at half price. Is it any wonder the most
regulated states and lines of insurance are witnessing withdrawal of
companies? Future generations will read with dismay about the current
attempts in North America to replace a market-based economy with
state planning at the same time Eastern Europe is moving toward a
market-based economy.
While some allege the McCarran-Ferguson Act allows insurers to
conspire to perform all sorts of vile acts, the antitrust exemption
conferred is limited, not all-inclusive. Price fixing is allowed only to the
extent sanctioned or imposed by state regulation. The independent
ratemakers broke the state-sanctioned insurance cartel by the early
1960s. Our concern now turns to the emergence of prices fixed, directly
or indirectly, by state regulation.
State Farm endorses modification of McCarran-Ferguson so long as
the avowed purpose of enhancing competition is advanced. To that end,
we believe any amendment should prevent states from regulating
independently developed rates in competitive lines of insurance.
RhetoricPLet There Be Light
Affordability and availability are two distinct problems, although
they are mentioned together so often one might believe the words are
synonyms. Without doubt auto insurance has become unaffordable for
many, not all of whom live in the inner city. Complicating the issue--
intensely--is the middle-class taxpayers’ revolt.
Affordability
Can costs, including insurer profits, be reduced significantly? The
answer is no. Allegations of gross inefficiencies really are attacks on
agents and the cost of their services. The other significant insurer
expenses are the costs of settling claims, including providing litigation
defense, and state premium taxes. The difference between average
profits and clearly substandard profits is two to three cents per premium
dollar.
Will anyone voluntarily provide subsidies for long? Absolutely not.
Consumers will not pay. Government will not tax. The leading commercial
writers are announcing with their feet the limits of cross-subsidization.DISCUSSION 157
Are there any Other solutions? Yes, the solution is to change the
system. Something is drastically wrong when the ratio of bodily injury
claims to property damage claims is five times higher in Philadelphia (75
percent) than in Pittsburgh (15 percent). Something is drastically wrong
when one-half of bodily injury claimants in Los Angeles are represented
before a claim is even asserted and three-fourths are represented before
the claim is settled. While these are metropolitan examples, the lottery
fever is spreading.
Monetary incentives for fraud and for litigation must be eliminated.
If economic losses were paid only once rather than two, three, or four
times, plus multipliers, the economic losses would decrease. If losing
litigants, including insurers, paid both parties’ costs of litigation, litiga-
tion would also decrease. Fraud bureaus, however commendable,
cannot do the job unassisted. The criminal justice system, already
overloaded in our metropolitan areas, was not designed to cope with
people running to get on the bus after the accident occurs.
Availability
Auto insurance is generally available, even in the worst of markets.
But brand-name insurance becomes harder to find when assigned risk or
joint underwriting plans are priced drastically below cost. When the
price of so-called high-risk plan insurance is held below voluntary
market prices, consumers make rational economic decisions by choosing
the lower-priced coverage. Statistical analysis then confirms the prevail-
ing prejudice: voluntary market insurance is not available.
Other lines of insurance become unavailable at any price when it is
no longer possible to estimate future exposure based on past experience.
For example, the market for day care center liability insurance virtually
disappeared when the courts signaled multiples of policy limits might be
available for intentional acts of a single person. The quest for deep
pockets to pay for.the cleanup of intentional acts of pollution dried up
the market for insurance against negligent and accidental pollution.
What other creative retroactive liability lies on the horizon?
Insurance cycles occur because insurer decision-makers fare no
better than economists in predicting or recognizing changes in trends.
Cycles are aggravated by competitors attempting to build or maintain
market share. Cycles persist because corrections for past errors, whether
underpricing or sloppy underwriting, take so long to bring down to the
bottom line. Those who seek to understand cycles need look no further.
Those who seek to modify or prevent cycles may yearn for a return to
the stability and uniformity of cartels.158 Roger S. Joslin
Profitability
The measurement of property and casualty insurance company
profit could stand improvement. Removal from the emotion-charged
field of rate regulation would help. Perhaps a disinterested third party
could do the job. As you may recall, the General Accounting Office
(1989) said property and casualty profits were below average and auto
insurance profits were below the property and casualty average. This
did not, however, prevent at least one politician running for office at the
time from claiming that the report showed that auto insurers in his state
were "making big money," as he had "known all along."
I marvel at the theoreticians’ fascination with the capital asset
pricing model (CAPM). Much of the literature suggests CAPM only
arguably measures what it purports to measure. Applicability to insur-
ance company profits appears totally dependent on bootstraps.
If insurer profits must be studied and measured, internal rate of
return appears promising as a methodology. Of course, any model is
dependent upon its assumptions. Allocation~ of surplus to line and
jurisdiction is a critical assumption. It does not make sense to me to
allocate surplus according to loss reserves, a past imbedded event, when
the risk of writing or renewing insurance policies relates to future
events.
Rate Regulation--Good or Bad?
Good rate regulation may be an oxymoron. Power over rates gives
the appearance and perception that the regulator can do more than a
little about the cost of insurance. The temptation to reallocate prices for
political advantage without regard to underlying costs is hard to resist.
Aggressive rate regulation tends to suppress symptoms until disease is
rampant.
The politician whose regulatory efforts increase the cost of insur-
ance or retard competition is nearly immune from accountability. The
public that views insurance as an unfair tax will accept price suppression
with gratitude. The complexity of the business makes it difficult to
isolate, let alone explain, the impact of various regulatory measures.
Given the time lag between cause and effect, the perpetrator will have
moved on to new endeavors before the seeds sown are recognized as
weeds. For many years one state’s elected insurance commissioner
would not grant a rate increase in an election year. He said, "This is the
policyholders’ year. Next year belongs to the companies." The year after
the election, companies received two years’ worth of adjustments. The
commissioner was not selling out consumers, only playing the game for
personal advantage.
On the other hand, a large state west of the Alleghenies has no rateDISCUSSION 159
.regulation. And for 20 years the insurance commissioner, the courts,
and insurance companies in Illinois have been spared the political dance
about rates. The state’s consumers have fared well, with premiums
below the average of comparable markets. Coverage is available. Com-
petition is hearty. Small companies have fared well. From time to time
rates have even decreased, as companies have had enough confidence
in the political environment to correct pricing errors downward as well
as upward.
It is hard to identify the accomplishments of rate regulation beyond
the opportunities for social engineering and political demagoguery.
Solvency--Courage, Not Crisis
Property and liability insurance does not face a solvency crisis. Most
companies are much more strongly capitalized than are savings and
loans, banks, and life insurers. Yet well-managed, responsible compa-
nies are continually embarrassed by and asked to pay for preventable, or
containable, insolvencies.
Effective regulation for solvency must be fair, understandable by
ordinary mortals, and automatic. Laws now on the books in many states
arguably are adequate. Yet delay is the rule rather than the exception.
Guaranty funds allow governors, insurance commissioners, and judges
to rest comfortably. Insurance accounting and widely accepted industry
practices are part of the problem. The politics of public image and clout
are ever present. The necessity for judicial sanction of a drastic remedy
provides untold opportunities for obfuscation.
Many insolvencies involve gross mismanagement. More than a few
result from outright fraud. As was demonstrated by GEICO and CNA,
honestly run, financially troubled property and casualty companies can
recover, given time. The key in all instances is to prevent management
from "making it up on volume."
Those concerned about property and liability insurer solvency
should:
(1) Eliminate the mirrors and shell games used to create the illusion
of solvency. Give no credit for reinsurance unless the reinsurer
and its contract meet stringent standards.
(2) Prevent naive or fraudulent optimism from funding growth.
Permit the booking of underwriting profit only after the accident
year has been closed for two or three years.
(3) Require good assets to fund liabilities. Marketable, investment-
grade, non-affiliated investments should exceed liabilities. Since
some "good" companies cannot meet this standard, a tolerable
compromise might require good assets to exceed discounted
indemnity and loss adjustment expense liabilities.160 Roger S. Joslin
(4) Establish minimum capital standards that are realistic, easy to
calculate, and risk-based. While some modern theorists recoil
from the simplicity of premium-to-surplus ratios, in a competi-
tive market premiums charged must bear a rational relationship
to the discounted flow of future claim payments. Premiums are
the leading edge of growth, which, particularly when rapid, is
more hazardous than stability. A clear regulatory statement
using ratios of premiums to surplus could read: 2:1 = strong;
3:1 = bears watching; 4:1 = hazardous; 5:1 = action re-
quired no new business; and 10:1 = drastic action re-
quired no renewals. The specific numbers are less important
than the words "action required."
(5) Reduce the profit opportunities and increase the risk of loss to
insider manipulators. Expand the definition and time period of
voidable preferences to allow conservators and liquidators to
recover compensation paid to owners, directors, officers, and
managing general agents. Make it easier to reverse "bad deals"
between troubled companies and financially interested parties.
This outline does not require federal intervention, although feder-
ally imposed minimum standards could speed the process. A few key
states could lead the way by requiring all companies doing business in
the state to meet these requirements. Regulators and the industry need
a dose of courage to rise above the lowest common denominator.
Conclusion
To summarize, cost reduction, not merely price reduction, should
be our goal. Overregulation may be good politics, but it is bad econom-
ics. Effective regulation should focus on the doable, namely assuring
that promises made are promises paid.
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James M. Stone*
It is said that asking the right questions is 90 percent of wisdom. By
that standard, J. David Cummins and Mary A. Weiss have written an
extraordinary paper. In its first few pages, the paper lays out a list of
queries that go right to the heart of the matter. This is a troubling period
for industry leaders and for regulators, and anyone who wants to know
why should begin to grapple with the catalog of Gordian knots these
authors offer up.
To paraphrase a few questions from the list: How serious is the
property and liability insolvency threat and what can anyone do about
it? Can some form of regulation help stop personal lines insurance
premiums from rising faster than general price and income indices, and
thus temper consumer anger? Are periodic crises in commercial lines
liability, accompanied by sudden price jumps and coverage reductions,
the inevitable consequence of our current civil justice system or of some
cyclical economic characteristic of this industry? Does the industry
behave in a competitive manner or is it a cartel? When I saw what
Cummins and Weiss were promising to clear up for me, I settled in for
an especially careful reading.
With respect to competition, the authors’ principal contribution is to
point out that lines of business written predominantly through inde-
pendent agents (including most commercial lines) tend to be less
concentrated than lines written mostly by direct writers (especially
personal auto, the industry’s largest line by far). This is an important
observation. The authors do not say it, but the implications of this
observation may give some reformers a modest pause in their current
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quest to reduce the independent agent role in personal auto insurance.
What lies behind the authors’ observation is the finding that direct
response insurance marketing, with its dependence on massive com-
puter systems and expensive list acquisitions, has economy-of-scale
characteristics so pervasive as to tend toward natural monopoly. Agency
marketing, with service competition as its principal driver, tends to have
few (or negative) economies of scale above some relatively low thresh-
old. To establish regulatory schemes that favor simply the lower
distribution costs, rather than a combination of low distribution costs
and good service, is to wish for a highly concentrated industry.
With respect to the severity of cycles in commercial insurance lines,
the authors dismiss the oversimplified notion of "cash flow underwrit-
ing" as the culprit. They correctly conclude that cash flow underwriting,
which is the acceptance of foolishly low premiums in order to generate
investable assets, can only be a problem if competition is somehow
excessive. This is a condition that no one seriously alleges concerning
the commercial property and liability insurance industry. Cummins and
Weiss do not say what does cause the commercial insurance cycles. My
own theory is that a part of the answer can be found in the literature of
market signaling. Whereas personal lines coverage is priced by statistical
inference and the law of large numbers, pricing in commercial lines is a
function of scarce data, artistic interpretation, intuition, and a sprinkling
of bla~ck magic. In other words, no one knows the right prices to charge,
so when the underwriter has finished searching his data and his heart,
he looks at what other artists (or magicians) at the competition are
doing. When they cut prices, the underwriter not only faces competitive
pressure, he feels he has received a valuable datum on the underlying
reality. When he responds, the market takes this signal too as a source
of data that prices should be lower. The same of course happens in the
upward direction, as was the case during the so-called liability crisis of
the 1980s. As long as underwriters must divine the future from far too
little information, I would expect that accentuated cycles will continue to
characterize the commercial lines.
With respect to solvency, the authors call for "extensive additional
research . . . to determine whether insurers actually pose a solvency
threat of savings-and-loan-industry magnitude." I am more optimistic
than they are, but only if the standard is comparability with the S&L
disaster. Property and liability companies have serious problems, and
doubtless a number of insolvencies will occur in the coming years. The
economics of this industry, however, were never as pernicious as those
of the deregulated savings and loan industry, where the higher the
short-horizon investment return (and consequently the higher the level
of portfolio risk), the more deposits the institution could attract, with
guarantees rendering scrutiny of solvency irrelevant to the customer.
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government guarantees, could have been an equal disaster. Even
without the guarantees, it had more than enough of such behavior, and
this has resulted in innocent victims aplenty with more to come. The
property and liability industry, which does have government guaran-
tees, has some offenders, but investment returns are a sufficiently small
component of price, and market shares sufficiently price inelastic in the
short run, to have kept this phenomenon from spinning totally out of
control. Worries about property and liability solvency are justified, and
the issues of obsolete accounting and weak reinsurance raised by the
authors are valid, but the comparison with S&Ls does not lead toward
the nub of the industry’s woes. Lack of guarantees and inertia in market
shares may have proved themselves a useful form of ballast.
Since I am the president of a highly regulated personal lines insurer,
I was particularly interested in reading what the authors would say
about the public policy issues in those lines. For that I had to wait for the
concluding pages, which state that the availability and affordability of
auto insurance are "beyond the control of the insurance industry . . .
(and) the auto insurance problem cannot be solved until the liability
system is brought under control .... Rate regulation is unlikely to solve
the problems .... More likely, restrictive regulation will exacerbate
these problems." This left me hungry, for this is the nub of the personal
lines industry’s woes.
My view is that auto insurance, a business the authors measure as
providing 45 percent of total industry revenues, is uniquely cursed. It is
compulsory in most states, and it is pronouncedly income regressive.
The cost is largely a function of traffic density, and of the prevalence of
theft and fraud. So it tends to cost more in crowded, poor, and
crime-damaged neighborhoods. Insurance in many core city areas today
costs the ordinary family upwards of $2,500, where family income might
average less than $25,000. Auto insurance in a posh suburb often costs
less than $750 a year, where the average family might earn $100,000. The
percentage arithmetic will highlight the regressivity. Good public trans-
portation is an alternative for all too few, and so it should be no wonder
that the honest urban resident, who needs a car to get to work, views
compulsory automobile insurance as a regressive tax. That the word
"tax" has a narrower meaning to lawyers is irrelevant, as was amply
proven by California’s Proposition 103. That ballot question, with a
lifetime of implications for industry economics, would not have passed
without overwhelming majorities in Los Angeles County, where the
regressivity is especially steep.
When the authors call this problem outside the control of insurers,
they are technically correct, but to leave it unsolved will subject the
industry to decades of torment. The industry must, if only to protect
itself, work closely with public officials and find a cure. Lessened
dependence on the tort mechanism and tighter fraud control, two tools164 James M. Stone
the authors favor, are worth pursuing, but they are politically elusive
and insufficient at their best. It may be time to reexamine the notion of
compulsory insurance, which I had long supported, if regressive income
effects are so closely coupled with it. And rate flattening by regulatory
design, however unseemly it looks to economic purists, is something we
had all better get used to. In 1977 as Insurance Commissioner, I initiated
a tempering of rate relativities across geographic territories in Massa-
chusetts, which I viewed as a justifiable spreading of social costs over a
broader social base. As an industry executive, I feel even more commit-
ted to that approach now. Simple solutions or benign neglect will not
solve the regressive tax problem in auto insurance.
Cummins and Weiss raise all the right questions, and I am person-
ally grateful for their complimentary reference to the "more sophisti-
cated rate-making methodologies" developed by regulators in Massa-
chusetts. But they only scratch the surface. I shall take their article as the
introduction to a much longer book they may soon write and I, for one,
will be certain to read.